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Abstract
We use quarterly sales data from the UK pharmaceuticals market between 2003 and 2013 and estimate
the impact of new introductions, i.e., new products and pack varieties within an anatomical therapy class
on business unit growth. Using a dynamic lag adjustment growth model that accounts for endogeneity of
new introductions, we find that a new product contributes to 18 per cent growth of the business unit while
a new pack variety leads to 7 per cent growth for the business unit in the long run. Further, we find that
there is significant variation in growth by size of firm and that the marginal effect of additional products
on growth is larger for smaller business units. However, the marginal effect of pack varieties does not differ
by firm size.
Key words: Pharmaceuticals, growth, product differentiation, non-linear pricing.
JEL Classification: F12, L25, L20.
1. Introduction
Product differentiation and non-linear pricing can be important strategies for firm growth. Compet-
ing firms can offer horizontally differentiated products to soften competition when consumers have
distinct preferences over attributes and increase their revenues and profits. For example, rather
than sell a medium sized shirt at an average price for all consumers, firms can offer large and small
shirts at higher prices as long as there is enough of a mass of consumers at each product location
to justify the additional cost of producing two horizontally differentiated products rather than one.
Barring threat of entry, a monopolist on the other hand may continue to produce a single sized
shirt, but can use non-linear pricing (or price discrimination more generally), to capture a larger
†The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of the ESRC who supported their research through Centre for Compe-
tition Policy funding (ref: RES-578-28-0002). The usual caveat applies.
∗Corresponding Author: Farasat Bokhari (f.bokhari@uea.ac.uk)
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share of the consumer’s surplus when consumers differ in their willingness to pay for a given prod-
uct.1 In pharmaceuticals, product differentiation and price discrimination are sometimes achieved
by introducing new varieties of existing products. A new variety may introduce a different molecule
or a new delivery mechanism for an existing drug that allows a firm to differentiate their drug from
that of a competitor, such as an extended release drug, or it may be a variation in pack size or
strength that allows the firm to price discriminate by charging different price per unit of quantity.
The use of these two different approaches is not peculiar to modern pharmaceutical companies, as
both strategies have been widely recognized in the industry in the past (Comanor, 1964, 1986, Lu
and Comanor, 1998).
Building on the insights from Hall (1987), Geroski and Machin (1992), Geroski and Toker (1996),
Freel (2000), Del Monte and Papagni (2003) and Demirel and Mazzucato (2012), that innovative
and/or more R&D active firms outperform non-innovating firms, in this paper we quantify the
returns from introducing additional drugs or products within the same therapeutic class, and from
introducing additional packs for a given drug on a business unit’s growth.2 We think of introduc-
tion of new products within the same therapeutic class as a product differentiation strategy that
requires innovation and R&D by the firm, and that of introducing additional packs that vary by
strength or size as a non-linear pricing strategy by the firm. We use quarterly sales data from the
UK pharmaceutical prescription market during the 2003-2014 period to measure firms’ growth by
therapeutic class, i.e., by the business unit, and identify the impact of additional product forms and
of new pack varieties on growth. By focusing on business unit as opposed to firm level analysis, we
are better able to measure the impact of follow-on products and pack variation on revenue growth
by the relevant sub-market. We treat the introduction of new products and packs as potentially
endogenous and instrument for these variables in a dynamic growth model.
Similar to some of other studies (e.g., Dunne and Hughes, 1994, Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003) we find
that smaller firms grow faster than larger ones. Our main result is that the introduction of new
formulations, as well as of new packs, has a significant impact on growth in the short run, but only
new forms have a long term effect on growth. Further, we find that new product introductions have
a stronger effect on growth for smaller business units than larger ones. However, the marginal effect
of pack varieties is much smaller in magnitude and does not statistically differ by the size of the
business unit. In this respect, that the marginal effect of new products is larger for smaller firms
is perhaps consistent with Demirel and Mazzucato (2012), who report positive impact of R&D on
growth for small firms, albeit as long as they are patenting consistently.
1There is a large literature on product differentiation and price discrimination and its review is not possible here. Interested
readers are directed to Bonanno (1987), Armstrong and Vickers (2001), Varian (1995, 1989) and Stole (2007).
2On the other hand, lack of such positive relationship is reported in Geroski et al. (1997) and Bottazzi et al. (2001).
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Product proliferation has long been recognized as a strategy to consolidate incumbent’s market
power by creating entry barriers for potential entrants (Bonanno, 1987). In a work based on the US
pharmaceutical data, Ellison and Ellison (2011) examine adjustments to presentation-level product-
mix by pharmaceutical firms just before the patent expires, and find (weak) evidence that product
proliferation delays generic entry. On the other hand, Appelt (2015) uses German pharmaceutical
data and finds that while a manufacturer with a patented drug may launch an additional equivalent
product as an authorized generic prior to patent expiration, this in itself does not lower the likelihood
of an independent generic entry post patent expiration. Similarly, Kyle (2011) shows that product
differentiation has also been a strategic response to changes in intellectual property rights and trade
barriers that legalized parallel imports within the European Union (EU).3
Small variations of existing products by molecule or form within a therapeutic class are called
follow-on or ‘me-too’ drugs in the literature, and their introduction has been criticized as a work
around to intellectual property rights and its limits (Lichtenberg and Philipson, 2002, Goozner,
2004, Hollis, 2004, 2005). A pioneer may introduce a follow-on drug as an attempt to extend the
monopoly period of its original drug, or alternatively a competitor may introduce a me-too as a
work-around the patented drug of a pioneer. Nonetheless, to the extent that these non-pioneer
second generation drugs within a therapeutic class are not necessarily superior to the original drug
for all patients (i.e., are not always vertically differentiated), they may be better for some patients
and provide opportunity for increasing firm profit via horizonal differentiation. For instance, me-
too drugs may provide substantial welfare gains by lowering the side effects of the pioneer drugs,
changing the delivery mechanism, or targeting a new sub-population and effectively increasing the
market size (Frijlink, 2003, DiMasi and Paquette, 2004, DiMasi and Faden, 2011, Arcidiacono et
al., 2013, Bokhari and Fournier, 2013).
However, product differentiation in pharmaceuticals is risky as it requires substantial R&D and
years of clinical trials, and thus a monopolist may not necessarily undertake developing a new
formulation absent any competition, or threat of competition (say due to patent expiration) from
other manufacturers. An example of such a case is the introduction of Adderall XR by Shire
which helped preserve its market shares. In 2000, Shire had 31.1% share of the US ADHD drug
market (psychostimulants) via its popular drug Adderall. At the time there were seven other brand
name firms and more than a dozen generic manufactures also producing other ADHD drugs using
different molecules, but due to a patent, which was valid for another two years, Shire was the only
one using the mixed amphetamine salt as the main active ingredient. Perhaps due to the threat of
the imminent entry by generics in two years (i.e., in 2002), Shire was able to engineer the timing of
3For instance, since manufactures price discriminate across countries, but are subject to threat of arbitrage by wholesale
parallel importers, product and pack variations increase transaction costs for the wholesalers as separate import licenses are
needed for each form and dosage variety.
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introducing an extended release version, Adderall XR in 2001, also under a patent for its delivery
mechanism. One year post-entry by the generic manufactures for the non-XR version of mixed
amphetamine salt, share of the generics was 7.6%, that of Adderall was 2.9%, but that of Adderall
XR was 23.8% (Bokhari and Fournier, 2013). As this example shows, Shire’s share of the ADHD
drug market could have been much smaller had it not introduced this blockbuster me-too as an
extended release version of an older drug. Thus, while the strategy of new product introduction
as a me-too to maintain or increase market shares is risky due to the stochastic nature of R&D
and market authorization process, the rewards to the firm may be high and may contribute to firm
growth.
An alternative strategy to product differentiation, and perhaps less risky in terms of the required
R&D and control over timing of introduction, is for the firm to engage in price discrimination when
possible. The empirical literature has focused on both the pricing strategies of originators post-
patent expiration (Frank and Salkever, 1992, Scherer, 1993, Regan, 2008) as well as on prices of the
follow-on and generics (Lu and Comanor, 1998, Ekelund and Persson, 2003, Danzon and Furukawa,
2011, Mueller and Frenzel, 2015). There is a large literature on price discrimination (third degree)
and welfare effects (Scherer, 2000, Danzon, 1997, Malueg and Schwartz, 1994) and when in the
presence of heterogeneous consumers firms can profitably divide the market in different brand loyal
and not-brand loyal groups via advertising to achieve second degree price discrimination (de Frutos
et al., 2013).
Apart from the classical third degree price discrimination, which applies to consumers organized
in groups, i.e. inter-personal pricing (see Varian, 1995), pharmaceutical companies can employ
product line pricing or second-degree price discrimination, i.e. intra-personal price discrimination,
which aims at capturing consumer types who would not be attracted otherwise (Armstrong and
Vickers, 2001). In many industries, this latter method is favored when consumers value firms’
product-line breadth, which permits them to avoid extra costs caused by incompatible products or
unknown brands (Klemperer, 1995). This can explain why in the pharmaceutical sector firms tend
to offer alternative varieties of the same drug under different format and quantity. It is achieved
via the introduction of additional packs that differ exclusively in quantity per pack and the price of
the pack. Thus, it is the result of a firm offering the same drug – molecule and form – in a different
size or strength, e.g. 20mg 28-pill pack versus 20mg 14-pill pack, where the price of the latter is
not half of the first pack, and similarly other combinations of strength and volume in different price
per unit of quantity.
The introduction of different packages for an already existing product is considered an important
strategic tool since it intensifies the firm’s market power and also increases the revenues of the initial
good introduced as first in the market (Klemperer and Padilla, 1997). There are clear examples of
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this non-linear pricing in the UK pharmaceutical data. For instance, Abbot’s Prothiaden, a selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) with dosulepin hydrochloride as the main active ingredient and
used for treating depression, was sold in the UK in 2003 as a 75mg 28-tabs pack for £4.20 per
pack or as 75mg 500-tabs pack for £85.81, which work out to £2.00 per gram and £2.88 per
gram respectively. Similarly, GlaxoSmithKline’s Sextrostat (also an SSRI with active ingredient
paroxetine) was available in two formulations: liquid oral suspension and tablets, where the latter
form was available as 20mg 30-tabs for £17.76 per pack and 30mg 30-tabs for £31.16 per pack, i.e.,
at £29.60 and £34.62 per gram respectively. While it is certainly true that pack variation, especially
one originating due to the difference in strength of 20mg versus 30mg, as in the Sextrostat example
above, is also a form of horizontal product differentiation, our data suggests that pack variety in
this industry, much like other industries, is perhaps best understood as a mechanism for non-linear
pricing rather than pure product differentiation.
In the next section we provide some background on the British pharmaceutical industry and discuss
our sales data within this context. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy as well as discusses
our instruments for the endogenous variables and section 4 presents and discusses the results. The
last section concludes.
2. Data and Background
The pharmaceutical sector in the UK is a crucial element of the manufacturing industry with a long
tradition in research and development (R&D) of new drugs and treatments. In 2011, pharmaceutical
R&D expenditures were £4.9 billion, and accounted for 28% of all R&D expenditures in the UK.
According to the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), more than 36% of
sales are invested in R&D with the aim to introduce new drugs to the market, and for every 25,000
compounds investigated in the laboratory, only 25 are tested on humans, and finally 5 of them
reach consumers, of which only one is used to obtain revenues for future R&D investment.4 During
the 1990s, the sector experienced robust sales growth, roughly 4.4% annual average, but since then
growth has slowed down significantly. For instance, the Office for National Statistics reports that
manufacturing fell by 25.9% between 2009 and 2013.
Several European countries use some form of price control to reduce total expenditure on pre-
scription drugs. A common tool is the external reference pricing, employed for instance in France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, where the relevant health authority uses the
average price from other EU countries to set the maximum reimbursement rate for a branded drug
(Kanavos, 2003, Kanavos and Kowal, 2008). The UK, by contrast, does not directly control drug
4See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/iop/index-of-production/april-2014/sty-pharmaceuticals.html and
http://www.abpi.org.uk/industry-info/knowledge-hub/uk-economy/Pages/leading-corporations.aspx and
http://www.abpi.org.uk/industry-info/future/Pages/default.aspx..
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prices, but instead regulates profit on sales of branded drugs to the National Health Service (NHS)
under its Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS). The scheme, which was initially intro-
duced in 1957, has evolved over the years, but as of 1986 it applies only to the branded drugs. Under
the PPRS, the terms of which are negotiated roughly every five years between the Department of
Health (DH) and the representatives of the industry via ABPI (1999, 2003, 2009 and 2014 in recent
years), firms are free to set prices of branded drugs, which the NHS will reimburse, but the scheme
caps the overall return on capital for research active pharmaceutical firms (Kanavos, 2003, Habl
et al., 2006, Vogler et al., 2009). Manufactures can introduce new drugs at a price set by them
rather than pre-approved by the DH. However, price increases for existing branded drugs need to
be justified and approved by the DH. Generics and branded generics are exempt from the PPRS
scheme.5 As such, generic companies are also free to set any price, but the reimbursement to the
pharmacist from the NHS is based on an internal price referencing; the reimbursement rate, called
the Drug Tariff, is updated and published every month by the DH and is based on the average price
of a basket of generic drugs from different manufacturers and wholesalers.
We use the 2003-2014 British Pharmaceutical Index (BPI) data series by Intercontinental Marketing
Services (IMS), which provides monthly sales figures at the package level for all drugs sold in the
UK. The BPI data set contains information in terms of total shipments by nominal sales value
and various measures of quantity from wholesalers to retail pharmacies and dispensing doctors,
but does not include direct sales from manufacturers to hospitals or to non-pharmacy stores (e.g.
grocery stores). Individual drugs in the data are identified by manufacturer, product name, and
pack variation. The data also includes information on main/active molecule(s), strength and form,
as well as if the drug is branded or generic, over the counter or prescription, and if it is reimbursable
by NHS or not. We restricted our analysis to prescription drugs covered by the NHS, i.e. over-
the-counter (OTC) or non-reimbursable drugs were excluded as these would be sold outside of
pharmacies as well, and we do not have complete sales data on those drugs.
For each individual item at the pack level, the data set lists the associated four-digit anatomical
therapeutic chemical code (ATC4) and three-digit new form classification code (NFC3). The ATC
codes allow drugs to be classified by active ingredients and are further refined by anatomical,
therapeutic, pharmacological and the chemical subgroups, while the NFC codes provide information
on various forms of the drug, e.g., tablet, capsule, extended release, liquid, cream etc.6 In our
analysis, we use the four digit ATC classification to define a ‘business unit’, and NFC codes to
5In the current context, ‘branded generics’ are off-patent drugs for which the manufacturer, who was not the originator,
has applied for a brand name.
6For instance, the first ATC4 letter defines the anatomical group, e.g. C denotes the ‘cardiovascular system’ while the
second group of digits indicates the therapeutic subgroup, e.g. C03 is for ‘diuretics’. The third entry is again a letter and
captures the pharmacological subgroup, thus, C03C stands for ‘high-ceilings diuretics’ and finally the fourth digit indicates
the chemical subgroup, for example C03CA are ‘sulfonamides’.
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differentiate among various products within a business unit. Thus we aggregate monthly sales data
from individual drugs at the pack level to ATC4 classification by manufacturer and quarter. For
example, acid pump inhibitors (A02B2) and psychostimulants (N06B0) produced by Novartis are
treated as two separate business units (BU) and in our analysis we compare the change in total
sales for each of these business units over time. The final sample consists of sales data from 218
pharmaceutical firms operating in 386 different ATC4 classes spanning across 2,092 business units
observed over 40 quarters (Q2 2003 to Q1 2013) for a total of 56,171 observations.7 All sales figures
are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index as deflator with base period set to second
quarter of 2003. As seen in Table 1, due to entry and exit of firms, business units over time do not
constitute a balanced panel.
Table 1. Sample size and total sales by year
year Firms Classes Business Total
(ATC4s) Units (BU) Sales (in MM)†
2003(Q2+) 139 345 1,441 6,061
2004 143 345 1,465 8,441
2005 143 343 1,444 7,861
2006 146 342 1,463 7,812
2007 149 348 1,459 7,815
2008 152 352 1,476 7,474
2009 158 352 1,482 7,387
2010 174 355 1,509 7,332
2011 174 355 1,527 7,057
2012 174 351 1,538 6,603
2013(Q1) 176 351 1,508 1,560
† All figures adjusted by CPI (base Q2 2003).
Consistent with other industry reports of a slow down in manufacturing, our data shows that
revenues dropped by 22 percent during the 2004-2012 period, while the number of firms has increased
by a similar proportion. The decay of real revenues over time may be an indication of the efficacy of
cost effectiveness policies implemented by the NHS, such as promotion of generic drugs, expansion
of parallel import, etc. or a reflection of greater competition in the industry leading to lower prices.
However, the number of classes and business units do not vary much over time.8
We also extracted information on total number of products and packs per product by business
unit. To be clear, a product is defined as the unique combination of molecules in a specific form
7The BPI does not separately identify all generic manufactures and hence within each ATC4 class multiple generic manu-
factures are treated as one firm.
8Though such information is not included in the table, about 77 percent of the classes are observed for all time periods,
versus 43.5 percent only for firms. Because of the high turnover of firms and the low turnover of classes, the number of firms
in a year is about half that of the classes.
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(tablet, extended release, liquid, gel, etc.) by a given firm within an ATC4 class. For instance,
Adderall and Adderall XR by Shire Plc. would be counted as two different products by this firm in
its psychostimulants business unit (N06BA). Similarly, for a given product, packs can vary either
by size (28 pill pack vs 14 pill pack) or by strength (100MG vs 250MG) and after counting total
number of packs per product, we define pack variety as the total number of packs aggregated over
all products within the BU minus the total number of products, and hence our pack variety measure
starts at zero (since every product must come in at least one pack type).
Figure 1. Products, varieties and sales per businesses unit
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Figure (1) shows the average value of aggregate sales per BU, where the aggregate is over all
products and packs related to the business unit, and the average is over all BUs. As noted earlier,
real total sales declined over the period and number of business units grew (due to entry), which
makes the decline in sales per BU even more drastic. There is also some evidence of seasonality in
sales. The figure also shows the average number of product and pack varieties per BU. While the
average number of products per BU is stable around 2.1, there is a sharp decline in the number of
pack varieties starting with 2009 and continues for the next two years until it settles to a new steady
state value. While this decline in the number of pack varieties coincides with the global financial
crisis, we did not observe a similar decline in pack varieties in the OTC and non-NHS reimbursable
drugs (recall we also have data on those drugs but are not using it in this analysis). The start of
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the decline however does coincide with the last PPRS update in the observation period which was
negotiated end of 2008 and was effective for the 2009-2013 period.
Table 2. Sales by product and variety†
Variety
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Overall
P
ro
d
u
c
ts
1 9.32 10.68 11.53 12.21 12.50 12.98 13.79 14.04 15.60 14.18 10.25
2 10.75 11.40 11.78 12.23 12.99 13.32 13.53 14.30 14.37 14.86 11.60
3 11.89 11.88 12.69 12.80 13.07 13.45 13.80 14.53 13.76 13.13 12.58
4 12.09 12.54 12.48 12.64 12.80 13.54 13.38 13.78 13.65 14.48 12.82
5 13.68 13.17 12.87 13.73 12.88 13.71 13.79 13.04 13.67 14.38 13.39
6 12.63 13.32 13.32 13.73 13.70 13.70 14.25 14.79 14.13 14.79 13.87
7 15.45 14.56 13.61 13.13 13.71 13.29 14.40 15.04 14.85 14.23 13.97
8 15.37 14.36 13.76 14.33 13.05 13.98 13.65 13.70 14.32 13.56 14.05
9 15.67 15.84 12.48 12.22 14.93 13.66 14.46 13.43 13.22 14.06 13.67
Overall 9.77 11.07 11.89 12.46 12.84 13.37 13.74 14.10 14.16 14.16 11.05
† Average value of ln Sales by Business Unit (BU).
While the figure above provides a snapshot of variation in average sales and products and pack
varieties over time, it masks the large variation across BUs and does not show the correlation
among these key variables. Instead, table (2) provides a snapshot of the relationship between (log)
revenues and number of products and varieties. A very strong positive correlation between revenue
and products/varieties is apparent from the table. Generally BUs with more products or pack
varieties have greater sales (see the last row or last column of the table) as does holding product
or varieties constant and increasing the other variable (movement along any given row/column).
The table also highlights some important nonlinearities. For low values of products an increase in
the number of varieties leads to larger revenues, a pattern which is shared also by varieties if we
were to look at low values of varieties and an increase in the number of products. However, when
the number of products (or varieties) is large, an increase in the number of varieties (products)
causes a drop in total revenues. This non-monotonicity suggests an interesting nonlinearity in the
relationship between revenues and number of products and varieties, which we aim to capture with
an interaction term in our econometrics.
In terms of growth, defined as the change in log sales, we find significant variation by the size of
the business unit. Figure 2 plots the natural logarithm of sales in period t against the one period
lagged value of the same variable. Values along the 45 degree line indicate absence of growth for
the BU while those above the line show positive growth. Interestingly, the variation is larger for
middle level of sales. On average, small sized BUs (approximately log sales < 9 ) grow more than
large sized BUs (approximately log sales > 14), but there is also greater variation in growth for
smaller business units.
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Figure 2. Log-log scatter plot of revenues
Table 3 provides summary statistics for all the main variables of interest in our empirical model.
Consistent with the earlier descriptive statistics, the average BU growth over the ten year period
is -0.02, while the average size of a business unit is 11.26 on the log sales scale (corresponding to
£1.34 million per quarter). However there is significant variation in both growth and size of BUs
cross-sectionally (between BUs ) as well as over time (within BUs) but for growth, the variation is
larger over time than cross-sectionally (within SD is 0.71 and between SD is 0.42). In fact, outside
of growth itself, between variation is larger for all variables of interest relative to variation over
time. In terms of the structure, while the average number of products and varieties per BU are
2.12 and 2.27, the same two variables at the class level are 8.6 and 9.27, implying that there must
be roughly three additional firms with an average of two products each competing with any given
BU. The lower part of the table confirms this and shows that on average there are 4.09 firms per
ATC4 class. The inter-class competition ranges from a monopoly to up to 29 different firms offering
their products in the same class of drugs. In terms of the herfindhal index, which ranges from .13
to 1 with an average value of .69 and a cross-sectional SD of 0.1, the UK pharmaceutical industry
for the prescription drug market appears fairly concentrated at the 4 digit ATC level. Nonetheless,
about 32% of business units face some form of competition from parallel importers for one of their
own products, and about 23% of BUs offer some generic product.
3. Empirical Specification
As our point of entry we use the “spokes model” developed by Chen and Riordan (2007) to study
business unit growth under an oligopoly framework that deals with introduction of new products
and packs. Allowing for an arbitrary number of possible product varieties and firms, the spokes
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Table 3. Summary statistics (within and between variation)∗
Variable Mean SD† Min Max Obs‡
Business Unit level variables
Growth overall -0.02 0.73 -9.26 12.21 53,258
(∆ ln Sales) between 0.42 -3.76 3.74 1,960
within 0.71 -8.89 13.59 27.17
Size overall 11.26 2.99 -1.46 18.63 56,070
(ln Sales) between 3.28 -0.21 18.25 2,090
within 1.20 -0.47 17.75 26.83
Products overall 2.12 2.29 1.00 31.00 56,171
between 1.89 1.00 27.53 2,092
within 0.57 -6.28 10.72 26.85
Variety overall 2.27 4.40 0.00 59.00 56,171
between 3.61 0.00 52.08 2,092
within 1.23 -18.10 26.90 26.85
Parallel Imports overall 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 56,171
(sales proportion) between 0.38 0.00 1.00 2,092
within 0.22 -0.65 1.30 26.85
Generics overall 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 56,171
(sales proportion) between 0.40 0.00 1.00 2,092
within 0.10 -0.74 1.20 26.85
Class level (ATC4) variables
Products overall 8.60 12.75 1.00 131.00 13,720
between 12.13 1.00 109.40 386
within 1.88 -9.55 32.45 35.54
Variety overall 9.27 20.34 0.00 218.00 13,720
between 19.05 0.00 170.70 386
within 3.83 -34.28 62.57 35.54
Herfindahl overall 0.69 0.28 0.13 1.00 13,717
Index (HHI) between 0.26 0.16 1.00 385
within 0.10 0.19 1.23 35.63
Number overall 4.09 3.85 1.00 29.00 13,720
of Firms between 3.68 1.00 25.58 386
within 0.76 -0.57 8.44 35.54
∗Variation over time or a given individual is called within (W) variation, and variation
across individuals (cross-section) is called between (B). Statistics for within are computed by
transforming the data by subtracting out the group mean and adding back in the overall mean.
†The overall variation can be approximately expressed as s2O ' s2W + s2B , where each
component is computed as follows: s2W =
1∑
i Ti
∑
i
∑
t (xit − xi)2; s2B = 1M−1
∑
i (xi − x)2;
s2O =
1∑
i Ti
∑
i
∑
t (xit − x)2.
‡Observations are listed as overall (M), over number of BUs (m) for between, and av-
erage number over time per BU (T ) for within.
model extends the classical Hotelling duopoly framework (as discussed in Anderson et al., 1992) and
develops a spatial model of localized competition to analyze firm performance due to entry of new
firms or additional varieties of the products. This framework is characterized by the presence of n
single-product firms offering N varieties (where N ≥ n) located in unitary lines, with consumers
placed over spokes of constant length terminating towards a common centre. Consumers can buy
from any firm regardless of their location on a given spoke. If a firm is not located in the same
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spoke as a consumer, then the consumer has to travel passing by the centre of the market (i.e. of
the spokes) to reach the other firm’s product. Consumers value product characteristics and they
can choose which product to buy according to the rank of their preferences, but they can buy
either their first or second most preferred brand. The model provides a (static) equilibrium profit
as a non-monotonic function of number of firms and varieties (see equation 5 in Chen and Riordan
(2007)). As an approximation, we can think of our business unit (as opposed to the pharmaceutical
firm itself) as the single-product firm of the Chen and Riordan’s spoke model, and interpret their
‘variety’ measure as our count of products and packs within the BU. Thus, in a panel setting,
we estimate the effect of products and packs on business unit revenue growth (rather than profit
which we do not observe) while controlling for number of firms in the business unit, as well as for
differences in other observables.
Specifically, let gfct ≡ (lnRfct− lnRfct−1) denote the revenue growth for firm f in anatomical class
c between period t and t− 1, and where f ∈ F and c ∈ C represent an element of the set of firms
and classes. To simplify the notation define b ≡ fc to represent a business unit. Then we model the
growth equation by an autoregressive distributed lag specification with M lags of the dependent
variable and up to L lags of the time varying strategic variables (products and varieties) as
gbt =
M∑
m=1
γmgb(t−m) +
L∑
l=0
(
β1lpb(t−l) + β2lvb(t−l) + β3lpb(t−l)vb(t−l)
)
+ θ1sb(t−1) + xbtθ2 + xctθ3 + ut + αb + εbt, t = L+ 1, . . . , T, L ≥M.
(1)
In the equation above the business unit growth in period t is a linear function of lagged growth (with
M lags), current and past values of number of products and pack varieties per product (p, v and
their interactions up to L lags) and where the latter variables are potentially endogenous. In the
final specification we set M = 1 and L = 4. The specification also includes other relevant variables,
prominently the one period lagged size (sb,t−1), which we capture with the lagged natural log of
revenue. We also include other class-time varying variables such as the number of firms, Herfindahl
index, and lagged values of number of products and pack varieties at the class level in the vector xct
and incorporate additional exogenous controls that vary at the BU level in xbt (specifically dummy
variables to indicate if the business unit has sales due to generic products and if its products are
available via parallel imports in the UK). A feature of our data is that the cardinality of C is larger
than that of F which in turn is larger than the number of time periods T . Hence, asymptotics rely
on the class dimension. For short panels it is common to let the time effect be fixed, here given by
ut and hence we exclude it from the composite error term, which is given by the sum of the business
unit unobserved heterogeneity, αb, and the pure idiosyncratic error term, εbt.
We assume the idiosyncratic error to be serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated across ATC4 classes.
Because of the presence of a lagged dependent variable we follow the dynamic linear panel model
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literature and take a first difference of equation (1) to remove inconsistencies of the parameters
associated to the various lags of the dependent variable. Thus we estimate the growth equation
above in first difference form and given by
∆gbt =
M∑
m=1
γm∆gb(t−m) +
L∑
l=0
[
β1l∆pb(t−l) + β2l∆vb(t−l) + β3l∆
(
pb(t−l)vb(t−l)
)]
+ θ1∆sb(t−1) + ∆xbtθ2 + ∆xctθ3 + τt + ∆εbt.
(2)
While the first difference form eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity specified earlier as αb term,
it is worth noting that by using a first difference estimator we also rule out estimating the effect of
any non-time varying factors such as the age of the business unit which may be important (see for
instance Cabral and Mata, 2003).
Instruments. The first difference equation cannot be estimated consistently by OLS since now
∆εbt = εbt − εb(t−1) is correlated with ∆gb(t−1) = gb(t−1) − gb(t−2) because gb(t−1) depends on εb(t−1)
per the initial specification. Note that this source of endogeneity is in addition to the poten-
tial endogeneity due to products and variety variables on the right hand side which may cause
E(∆pb(t−l),∆εbt) 6= 0 and E(∆vb(t−l),∆εbt) 6= 0, and obviously E(∆(pb(t−l)×vb(t−l)),∆εbt) 6= 0, with
l = {0, 1} in the original levels equation. Put simply, products and varieties can be endogenous,
for instance, if there is any reverse causality (growth rates determining if new products and vari-
eties are introduced) or if other omitted variables that are responsible for both the introduction
of new products and varieties also contribute to the growth of the business unit. Thus, we treat
∆gb(t−1) as well as ∆pbt, ∆vbt, their interaction term, and in some specifications their lagged values
as endogenous variables.
To identify the effect of an additional drug or variety, as well as that of the lagged growth, lagged
size and other variables, we estimate the equation above using instrumental variables. To be valid,
the instruments need to be uncorrelated with revenue growth except for a correlation via the other
explanatory variables that determine growth, and to be relevant they need to be correlated with
the endogenous variables. To this end we use the time series dimension of the panel and obtain
instruments for the change in lagged dependent variable by following Anderson and Hsiao (1982).
Specifically, for m = 1, we can instrument ∆gb(t−1) with gb(t−2) since the latter term is uncorrelated
with ∆εbt by construction, and for m > 1, Anderson and Hsiao propose other lagged dependent
variables as instruments for themselves, i.e., that they can be treated as exogenous.
To find valid instruments for products and varieties, we exploit the assumption that the idiosyncratic
error is serially uncorrelated and independent across ATC classes and of the multi-class presence
of most of the firms in our data. Our identification strategy relies on an implicit assumption that
a firms’s propensity to introduce additional products and varieties is common across its various
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business units, and hence number of products and varieties will be correlated across BUs, but that
any changes in the number of products and varieties in one BU do not not directly affect growth in
another BU. Thus, to construct the instrument for number of products for a business unit, which
recall is defined as the combination of firm and the four digit ATC class, we compute and use
the average value of number of products by the same firm in other related classes, where related
is defined as other ATC4 classes within the same two digit ATC classification. Specifically, we
instrument ∆pbt with ∆p−bt, where p−bt is computed as the firm’s average value of p over time and
over ATC4 classes within the same ATC2 class excluding the current ATC4 class and current time
period. Thus we obtain an instrument that varies by the business unit and time and which can
be thought of as the deviation from the BU’s long-run steady state average number of products,
where the latter is determined at the firm level in related classes. The logic is extended to derive
instruments for the lagged values, i.e., ∆p−b(t−1) as instrument for ∆pb(t−1), as well as for other
lagged values of this variable. The instruments for number of pack varieties and its lag values are
also constructed in a similar manner. Finally, the instrument for the interaction between number
of products and varieties is constructed as the interaction of the instruments for number of product
and those for number of varieties (and similarly for any lagged values of the interaction term).
Note that if a firm does not operate in more than one ATC4 class within the ATC2, we cannot
construct an instrument for its products and varieties in the manner described above. However, to
handle such cases, we can either drop the requirement of going outside the current ATC4 class and
just use the average value from other time periods, or alternatively, use the average value from other
time periods and any other ATC4 classes (i.e., do not restrict to average from the same ATC2 class
assuming the firm operates in some other ATC class). Thus we also experimented with alternative
ways of constructing these instruments by averaging the value of products or varieties over all other
ATC4 classes rather than just those within the same ATC2 class, or over other time periods except
the current time period but the alternative instruments either turned out to be weak (when we went
too wide) or were suspect for validity (when we averaged only over other time periods). The main
instruments listed here generally performed well when we restricted the sample to BUs that operate
in more than one ATC4 class in various statistical tests relating to under and over identification,
as well as first-stage weak instruments F-tests.
4. Results and Discussion
OLS Estimates. Table 4 provides estimates of select coefficients and marginal effects under al-
ternative specifications of equation (2) while the detailed set of results are given in the appendix.9
9All specifications include dummy variables for year and quarter, if the business unit has any sales due to generic products
or due to parallel imports, and class level variables which include one period lag of number of products and varieties by
competitors, number of competitors, and of HHI index for the class. These coefficients have been been suppressed in the text
but are given in the appendix.
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Column (1) lists OLS results from a parsimonious specification that does not include lags of either
the dependent variable (growth) or the lags of products and varieties. However this specification
includes lagged size, which in contradiction to Gibrat’s law of proportionate growth (see also Simon
and Bonini, 1958), has a negative and significant coefficient indicating larger growth for smaller
business units. This result is also consistent with the growth pattern by firm size noted earlier in
Figure 2. Further, the number of products and varieties have positive and significant coefficients
and the coefficient on products is roughly twice as large as that on varieties. Because of the in-
teraction term, which is negative and significant (albeit two orders of magnitude smaller), we also
provide marginal effects in the lower part of the table: a one unit increase in products is associated
with a 32% increase in growth rate, while a one unit increase in varieties is associated with 15.9%
increase in growth for the BU.10
In column (2) we provide OLS estimates of a distributed lagged model of the first difference form,
which includes up to four lags of products, varieties, and the interaction of these terms. Due to
the addition of these lagged variables to the model, the number of observations drop from ∼ 50K
to ∼ 45K. Instead of displaying estimated coefficients on each of these 12 lagged terms, we list in
Table 4 the sum of the four lags for each of the three variables, along with standard error of the
sum of coefficients.11 Column (3) also provides OLS estimates on the first difference equation, but
now extends the specification to an augmented distributed lagged model that includes four lags of
the dependent variable (growth), and where once again, the additional lags are listed by sums of
coefficients, and the number of observations further decrease to ∼ 43K due to the addition of these
lagged variables to the model.
Note that in moving from a static specification in column (1) to the distributed lagged model in
(2) or to a fully dynamic specification in (3), the coefficient on the size of BU does not change by
much (from -1.03 to -1.05 and significant). However, the coefficients on contemporaneous values
of products, varieties and the interaction term each decrease in magnitude, while the sum of the
coefficients of the lagged values for products and varieties take on positive (and significant) values,
at least in the sum of these lagged coefficients. Marginal effects are again given in the lower part of
the table, but due to the lagged values of the variables in the dynamic growth models, it is possible
to estimate long run and short run marginal effects separately.12 Observe that the long run marginal
10For the static model (column (1)), the marginal effect for product is ∂gbt/∂pbt = β10 + β30vbt. We evaluate it at the
sample average value of vbt given in Table 3. The marginal with respect to variety is computed in a similar manner. The
standard errors are computed via the ‘delta’ method.
11The standard errors for the sum of the coefficients are computed using the ‘delta’ method and individual coefficients
rather than the sum of these coefficients is given in the full set of results in the appendix.
12Column (2) is a distributed lag model and hence the long-run marginal effect with respect to a product is given by
∂gbt/∂pbt = β10 + β30vbt +
∑4
j=1(β1j + β3jvb(t−j)) while the short run marginal effect is the same expression as the one given
for the static model in column (1). Marginal effects with respect to variety are computed in a similar manner. Column (3)
is an augmented distributed lag model and long-run marginal effect with respect to product is ∂gbt/∂pbt = (β10 + β30vbt +∑4
j=1(β1j + β3jvb(t−j)))/(1−
∑4
m=1 γm) with an equivalent expression of marginal with respect to variety.
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Table 4. First difference growth models†
OLS IV (6) By Size (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6S) (6M) (6L)
sb,t−1: Lagged size -1.03a -1.05a -1.05a -0.77a -0.72a -0.73a -1.06a -0.63a -0.68b
(0.014) (0.016) (0.034) (0.097) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.22) (0.28)
pbt: Products 0.34
a 0.30a 0.28a 0.27a 0.27a 0.28a 1.17a 0.29a 0.18b
(0.047) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.052) (0.052) (0.45) (0.11) (0.075)
vbt: Varieties 0.18
a 0.15a 0.14a 0.14a 0.16a 0.16a 0.59a 0.27a 0.083a
(0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.18) (0.054) (0.028)
pbtvbt: Interaction -0.85
a -0.73a -0.67a -0.65a -0.75a -0.78a -11.0b -1.90b -0.41b
(Products×Varieties) (×10−2) (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.21) (5.70) (0.82) (0.19)
gb,t−1: Growth -0.0058 -0.27a -0.33a -0.33a -0.14 -0.33 -0.21
(Lag 1) (0.026) (0.095) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.21) (0.27)∑4
l=1 pb,t−l: Products 0.195
a 0.192a 0.111b 0.153c 0.153a 0.773b 0.171 0.066
(Sum of coefficients lags 1-4)†† (0.038) (0.041) (0.045) (0.086) (0.059) (0.317) (0.141) (0.051)∑4
l=1 vb,t−l: Varieties 0.069
a 0.065a 0.021 0.032 0.018 0.212 0.146 0.020
(Sum of coefficients lags 1-4)†† (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.037) (0.025) (0.163) (0.091) (0.017)∑4
l=1 pb,t−lvb,t−l: Interaction -0.005
a -0.005a -0.003b -0.005c -0.005b -0.056c -0.015 -0.002c
(Sum of coefficients lags 1-4)†† (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.032) (0.012) (0.001)∑4
m=2 gb,t−m: Growth -0.286
a -0.663a -0.857a -0.854a -0.762a -0.681c -0.452
(Sum of coefficients lags 2-4)†† (0.066) (0.164) (0.186) (0.184) (0.204) (0.376) (0.383)
Marginal effects of products and varieties ‡‡
Products (Short run) 0.285a 0.201a 0.131a 0.114a 0.119a 0.562a 0.130a 0.098b
(0.037) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.211) (0.049) (0.04)
Products (Long run) 0.320a 0.467a 0.340a 0.185a 0.178a 0.183a 0.941a 0.205b 0.131b
(0.044) (0.053) (0.042) (0.029) (0.049) (0.041) (0.349) (0.09) (0.053)
Varieties (Short run) 0.134a 0.098a 0.064a 0.067a 0.067a 0.229a 0.116a 0.042a
(0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.057) (0.022) (0.013)
Varieties (Long run) 0.159a 0.191a 0.140a 0.071a 0.077a 0.070a 0.299b 0.176a 0.049a
(0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.012) (0.021) (0.017) (0.116) (0.049) (0.019)
Observations 50,942 44,893 42,994 42,994 23,054 23,054 5,581 8,334 9,139
R-squared 0.535 0.514 0.513 0.507 0.521 0.521 0.624 0.462 0.395
†Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered by business unit (firm-atc4 combination). Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All regressions include additional controls at the class and BU level, as well as indicator variables for
year and quarter (see Table A-1 in the appendix for detailed results).
Specification (1) does not include any lags, (2) is a distributed lag model and includes up to four lags of products, varieties and
interactions. Specification (3) is an augmented distributed lag model that includes four lags of the dependent variable (i.e., growth).
Specification (4) treats only the first lag of growth as endogenous, (5) treats the first lag of growth, as well as products, and varieties, and
their interaction and all four lags of each of these as endogenous variables (total 16), and specification (6) treats the first lag of growth
and only the contemporaneous values of products, varieties and interaction as endogenous variables (total of 4 endogenous variables).
Specifications (6S), (6M), and (6L) are same as (6), but on sub-samples by initial size of business unit being (s)mall, (m)edium and (l)arge.
††For brevity we provide the sum of coefficients of the lagged variables. Individual coefficients for each of the lags is given in
the appendix. The standard error on the sum of lagged coefficients is computed using the ‘delta’ method and accounts for clustering.
‡‡ Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean. The account for the interaction terms, the lagged values of the variable as well as
the lagged values of growth. Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
effects in specification (3) are similar to those in the static model, i.e., 34% and 14% for products
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and varieties respectively, but the short run boost in revenue from an additional product or variety
is 20% and 9.8% respectively.13
IV Estimates. The next three columns re-estimate the dynamic growth model of (3) under al-
ternative assumptions about the correlation of the error term with some of the right hand side
variables. Column (4) shows the results when only the first lagged value of growth is treated as
endogenous, and accordingly instrumented for, but all other variables are assumed to be exoge-
nous. The lagged value of growth is treated as endogenous because, as argued earlier, in the first
difference form the first lagged value of the dependent variable becomes correlated with the error
term by construction. Next, column (5) additionally treats the past and contemporaneous values
of products, varieties and their interactions as endogenous, so 16 total endogenous variables, while
column (6) treats only the first lagged value of growth and the contemporaneous values of products,
varieties and interaction as correlated with the error term and hence only four variables are treated
as endogenous in this model. Further, in columns (5) and (6) we restrict the sample to where a BU
operates in more than one ATC4 class within the ATC2 due to availability of instruments (recall
we construct the instruments for products and varieties for BU as the average value in other classes
and over time for the same firm, and hence the value is not available if the firm operates in only
one ATC4 class).14 For each of the three models, results related to the first stage F-statistics (weak
instruments test), under identification and over identification are given in the appendix in table
Table A-2. In all cases the first stage F-statistics suggest that the instruments are not weak as the
relevant F-values are always above 10, and in all three specifications, the null of under identification
is rejected and in models (5) and (6) the null of over identification in not rejected (model 4 is just
identified so test is not available). All in all, the statistical tests summarized in table (A-2) lend
support to these instruments as valid and relevant.
In terms of the main results, the largest change in estimated parameters and marginal effects comes
when we move from column (3), where all variables are treated as exogenous, to column (4) which
treats the first lag of the dependent variable as an endogenous variable. The coefficient on the
lagged size drops from -1.05 to -0.77 (though still statistically significant) with some appreciable
change in the lagged coefficients for products and varieties as well. The change is enough that the
estimated long run marginal effects with respect to products and varieties (compute at the sample
13For the static model in column (1), there is no distinction between short run and long run marginal effects since it is not
built into the specification. However, when comparing the results between static and dynamic models (where the latter does
have this distinction), we choose to interpret the results from the static model as those corresponding to the long run because,
(i) the static model can be seen as an adjustment to long run equilibrium, and (ii) because the static model in (1) can itself
be viewed as restricted version of (3) where the additional coefficients on the lags are constrained to be zero and hence the
expression for the long run marginal effects in (2) and (3) correspond to the marginal effect in column (1).
14An alternative set of instruments discussed earlier is to include BUs that operate within only a single class and to construct
instruments using the average value from other time periods. Results from these alternative instruments are qualitatively
similar but since their validity is suspect we prefer to restrict the sample to firms that operate in more than one ATC4 class
and not use variation over time alone to construct the instruments.
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mean) drop to roughly half their previous values, i.e., from 34% and 14% in column (3) to 18.5%
and 7.1% in column (4). The results in the next two columns with either all variables related to
products and varieties are endogenous or just their contemporaneous values are endogenous are
quite similar. While there is not much difference in the estimated parameters and marginal effects
in the three models, we use the specification in (6) as our preferred model to discuss further the
marginal effects.
Figure 3. Marginal Effects – Products and Varieties
Note that due to the interaction term between products and varieties (which are significant in all
models), the marginal effects are not constant. For instance, the marginal effect with respect to
products is a function of varieties, and similarly the other way round, and this is true for both
the long run and short run marginal effects. While Table 4 above reports these marginal effects
at the mean value of the relevant variables (for instance ∂g/∂p at v¯), Figure 3 plots the estimated
marginal effect of products for a range of observed values of varieties, and similarly the marginal
effect of varieties for a range of values of products. The marginal effects are for both the long run
and short run, and the vertical error bars are set equal to the estimated standard error.
Each of the four marginal effects are positive and significantly different from zero for a range of
observed values of products and varieties (and not just at the sample mean values of 2.12 and
2.27), but equally important, the negative slopes of these graphs imply that the impact on growth
from an additional product is smaller if the BU has many pack varieties than if it had fewer pack
varieties. Similarly, the marginal with respect to pack varieties is diminishing in products. The
figure also show that while there is a (statistical) difference in the long and short run marginal
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effect of additional products, there is virtually none in the long and short run for varieties. In turn,
these imply that the boost in sales from additional pack varieties are smaller but more immediate,
whereas those from introducing additional products are larger, but also over a longer period of time.
By Size (IV Estimates). So far our analysis controls for size of the business unit but does
not allow for the impact of products and varieties on growth to vary by the size of the business
unit. To study this effect, one possible extension is to allow for an interaction between (lagged)
size and products and varieties so that the marginal effects can vary by size. Instead, due to the
richness of our data, we allow for more flexible version by re-estimating specification (6) on separate
sub-samples by size, which in turn let all coefficients vary by size, rather than just those related to
products and varieties. Columns (6S), (6M) and (6L) in Table 4 display estimates from sub-samples
by business unit size classified as small, medium and large respectively, based on their initial size.
Figure 4. Long Run Marginal Effects by Firm Size
(i) LR Marginal Effect wrt Products (ii) LR Marginal Effect wrt Varieties
The change in the estimated coefficients for the relevant variables are substantial, both when the
comparison is done within the sub-sample of class sizes and when it is set against the entire sample
displayed in column (6). Almost all coefficients of interest (lagged size, products, varieties and
interactions) increase in magnitude for small business units and decrease for large business units.
For instance, in column (6) the coefficient on products is 0.28 but this increases to 1.17 in (6S)
and decreases to 0.18 in (6L) (and stays fairly close to the original value for (6M) sample). Similar
patterns can be observed for other coefficients. In fact, as Figure 4 shows, the long run marginal
effect of new products is positive (and much greater for small BUs than for large BUs) over a wide
range of pack varieties. On the other hand, the marginal impact of additional variety on growth is
much smaller (and even becomes negative in out of sample projections when a small BU has a large
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number of products) and is not statistically different for small vs large firms. While several studies
have found evidence supporting growth by small firms (see for instance Calvo, 2006) or at least for
short periods after birth (e.g. Lotti et al., 2003), our results shed insight into this mechanism for
growth: the returns in terms of growth from introducing a new product are much larger for small
firms than for large firms.
5. Conclusions
Pharmaceutical firms often launch additional products within the same therapeutic class or launch
additional pack varieties of existing drugs. Additional products are a form of product differentiation
while the introduction of an additional pack is perhaps better understood as a non-linear pricing
strategy. Previous literature on product introduction, particularly the me-too literature, has focused
on consumer welfare and competitive effects of follow-on drugs, while the pricing literature has
focused on prices by branded and generic firms pre- and post-patent expiration. We complement
those studies by estimating the impact of additional products and pack varieties on growth of a
business unit in the long and short run, and classify our results by the size of the business unit.
Primary identification difficulty is that previous period growth may impact both the current period
growth as well as any change in the number of products and packs by the business unit or that other
unobserved factors may explain change in both the variables. To overcome this issue, we use the
lagged values of growth in the specification but also use a firm’s propensity to introduce products
and packs, as measured by average values of these same variables in other periods and related ATC
classes, as instruments for the endogenous variables.
One of our main results is that a new product leads to a 12 per cent growth in the short run and 18
per cent in the long run, whereas a new pack variety only produces a short term effect of about 7 per
cent growth with no additional impact over the long run. To the extent that additional products
with a narrowly defined anatomical class can be thought of as me-too drugs, we interpret the first
result as empirical evidence that innovation is an important driver of firm’s (business unit’s) growth
in the UK pharmaceutical market. Further, strategies of second degree price discrimination such
as pack variety, are considered a good alternative to trigger short term growth.
We also find that in the British pharmaceutical sector, smaller business units grew more than
the larger ones. Equally importantly, given an existing combination of products and varieties, an
additional product may be more profitable vis-a-vis opportunity for growth for the smaller business
unit than for larger units. On the other hand, the difference in marginal with respect to pack variety
(or price discrimination) by size of business unit is much smaller and the effect is not statistically
different by size of the unit.
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Appendix
Table A-1. FD Growth Models†
OLS IV (6) By business unit size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6S) (6M) (6L)
sb,t−1: Size -1.03a -1.05a -1.05a -0.77a -0.72a -0.73a -1.06a -0.63a -0.68b
(Lagged Size of Bus. Unit) (0.014) (0.016) (0.034) (0.097) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.22) (0.28)
pbt: Products 0.34
a 0.30a 0.28a 0.27a 0.27a 0.28a 1.17a 0.29a 0.18b
(0.047) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.052) (0.052) (0.45) (0.11) (0.075)
vbt: Variety 0.18
a 0.15a 0.14a 0.14a 0.16a 0.16a 0.59a 0.27a 0.083a
(0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.18) (0.054) (0.028)
pbtvbt: Interaction -0.85
a -0.73a -0.67a -0.65a -0.75a -0.78a -11.0b -1.90b -0.41b
(Products×Variety) (×10−2) (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.21) (5.70) (0.82) (0.19)
gb,t−1: Growth -0.0058 -0.27a -0.33a -0.33a -0.14 -0.33 -0.21
(Lag 1) (0.026) (0.095) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.21) (0.27)
x1bt: Any PI Sales? 0.10
a 0.11a 0.10a 0.100a 0.10a 0.10a 0.13 0.14a 0.041
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.12) (0.050) (0.043)
x2bt: Any generic products? -0.018 -0.17
b -0.14 -0.13 -0.051 -0.052 -0.45c 0.47c -0.21b
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.15) (0.086) (0.092) (0.095) (0.12) (0.12) (0.26) (0.26) (0.087)
x1c,t−1: Products in Class (×10−2) 0.23 0.012 -0.062 -0.0061 -0.013 0.0033 -0.60 1.40 -0.55
(Lag 1 of Products by Others) (0.37) (0.39) (0.33) (0.33) (0.49) (0.49) (1.3) (0.91) (0.40)
x2c,t−1: Varieties in Class (×10−2) -0.57b -0.22 -0.12 -0.12 -0.55b -0.55b -2.0b 0.32 -0.53b
(Lag 1 of Varieties by Others 1) (0.23) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.27) (0.27) (0.91) (0.50) (0.26)
x3c,t−1: HHI 0.40b 0.33c 0.41b 0.41b 0.31 0.31 0.41c 0.24 -0.25
(Lag 1) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.46) (0.31)
x4c,t−1: Firms in Class -2.60b -1.30 -0.58 -0.66 -1.10 -1.10 0.40 -3.0c 0.34
(Lag 1) (×10−2) (1.00) (0.80) (0.76) (0.75) (1.20) (1.20) (3.80) (1.70) (0.86)
(Lags)
gb,t−2: Growth -0.13a -0.33a -0.41a -0.41a -0.32a -0.34c -0.26
(Lag 2) (0.031) (0.083) (0.092) (0.090) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19)
gb,t−3: Growth -0.14a -0.27a -0.34a -0.34a -0.32a -0.26c -0.19
(Lag 3) (0.030) (0.061) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.14) (0.14)
gb,t−4: Growth -0.018 -0.072a -0.11a -0.11a -0.12a -0.083 -0.0075
(Lag 4) (0.012) (0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.055) (0.060)
pb,t−1: Products 0.11a 0.10a 0.092a 0.074a 0.10a 0.41b 0.15c 0.043b
(Lag1) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.16) (0.077) (0.019)
pb,t−2: Products -0.0026 0.039b 0.017 0.059 0.041 0.19 0.086c 0.018
(Continued on next page)
Observations 50,942 44,893 42,994 42,994 23,054 23,054 5,581 8,334 9,139
R-squared 0.535 0.514 0.513 0.507 0.521 0.521 0.624 0.462 0.395
†Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered by business unit (firm-atc4 combination). Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All regressions include additional controls at the class- and firm-level, as well as indicator variables for year
and quarter. Specification (1) does not include any lag, (2) is a distributed lag model and includes up to four lags of products, varieties
and interactions. Specification (3) is an augmented distributed lag model, and additionally includes up to four lags of the dependent
variable (i.e., growth). Specification (4) treats only the first lag of growth as endogenous, (5) treats the first lag of growth, as well as
products, and varieties, and their interaction and all four lags of each of these as endogenous variables (total 16), and specification (6)
treats the first lag of growth and only the contemporaneous values of products, varieties and interaction as endogenous variables (total
of 4 endogenous variables). Specifications (6S), (6M), and (6L) are same as (6), but on sub-samples by initial size of business unit being
(s)mall, (m)edium and (l)arge.
††For brevity, we provide the sum of coefficients of the lagged variables. Individual coefficients for each of the lags is given in the appendix.
The standard error on the sum of lagged coefficients is computed using the ‘delta’ method and accounts for clustering.
‡‡ Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean. The account for the interaction terms, the lagged values of the variable as well as
the lagged values of growth. Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
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Table A-1. FD Growth Models†
OLS IV (6) By business unit size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6S) (6M) (6L)
(Lag 2) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.038) (0.026) (0.14) (0.051) (0.023)
pb,t−3: Products 0.021 0.021 -0.0048 -0.0037 -0.0035 0.023 -0.042 -0.00028
(Lag 3) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.072) (0.055) (0.016)
pb,t−4: Products 0.067b 0.030c 0.0073 0.025 0.012 0.16b -0.019 0.0042
(Lag 4) (0.027) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.078) (0.049) (0.017)
vb,t−1:Variety 0.040a 0.043a 0.036a 0.040a 0.041a 0.20a 0.12a 0.019b
(Lag 1) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.070) (0.038) (0.008)
vb,t−2: Variety -0.32 1.20c -0.066 0.98 0.19 5.10 4.50 0.17
(Lag 2)(×10−2) (0.99) (0.68) (0.85) (1.60) (0.92) (4.80) (3.00) (0.76)
vb,t−3: Variety 1.00c 0.90 -0.48 -0.92 -0.93 -0.25 -1.40 -0.16
(Lag 3) (×10−2) (0.59) (0.55) (0.65) (1.10) (0.78) (4.70) (2.50) (0.55)
vb,t−4: Variety 2.20b 0.11 -1.00 -0.92 -1.60 -3.30 -0.82 0.047
(Lag 4) (×10−2) (1.10) (0.65) (0.72) (1.40) (0.99) (4.80) (2.10) (0.50)
pb,t−1v3,t−1: Interaction -0.26a -0.26a -0.22a -0.22b -0.30a -3.30c -1.10 -0.14b
(Products×Variety, Lag 1) (×10−2) (0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.087) (0.084) (2.0) (0.65) (0.060)
p2,t−2v3,t−2: Interaction -0.044 -0.13a -0.067 -0.20c -0.15b -1.30 -0.63b -0.065
(Products×Variety, Lag 2) (×10−2) (0.061) (0.042) (0.045) (0.12) (0.066) (1.30) (0.32) (0.053)
p2,t−3v3,t−3: Interaction -0.053 -0.053 0.020 0.0054 -9.8e-04 -0.11 0.17 -0.010
(Products×Variety, Lag 3) (×10−2) (0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.077) (0.049) (0.67) (0.31) (0.034)
p2,t−4v3,t−4: Interaction -0.17a -0.076b -0.016 -0.087 -0.028 -0.83 3.2e-05 -0.014
(Products×Variety, Lag 4) (×10−2) (0.062) (0.037) (0.039) (0.082) (0.046) (0.84) (0.20) (0.029)
τ1t: Yr 2004 -0.011 0.0044 -0.036 -0.034 -0.068 -0.022
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.017) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.045) (0.025)
τ2t: Yr 2005 -0.015 -0.032
b -0.019 -0.012 -0.047b -0.047b -0.026 -0.046 -0.057b
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.096) (0.035) (0.027)
τ3t: Yr 2006 -0.0083 -0.022 -0.0089 -0.0046 -0.046
b -0.045b -0.035 -0.071c -0.034
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.089) (0.038) (0.027)
τ4t: Yr 2007 0.00049 -0.019 -0.0048 -0.0027 -0.052
b -0.051b 0.0055 -0.074c -0.056b
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.088) (0.040) (0.025)
τ5t: Yr 2008 0.0012 -0.018 -0.0089 -0.0031 -0.048
b -0.047b -0.0042 -0.073b -0.038
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.092) (0.036) (0.027)
τ6t: Yr 2009 -0.018 -0.031
b -0.014 -0.0093 -0.051b -0.050b 0.014 -0.100a -0.031
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.090) (0.039) (0.025)
(Continued on next page)
Observations 50,942 44,893 42,994 42,994 23,054 23,054 5,581 8,334 9,139
R-squared 0.535 0.514 0.513 0.507 0.521 0.521 0.624 0.462 0.395
†Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered by business unit (firm-atc4 combination). Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All regressions include additional controls at the class- and firm-level, as well as indicator variables for year
and quarter. Specification (1) does not include any lag, (2) is a distributed lag model and includes up to four lags of products, varieties
and interactions. Specification (3) is an augmented distributed lag model, and additionally includes up to four lags of the dependent
variable (i.e., growth). Specification (4) treats only the first lag of growth as endogenous, (5) treats the first lag of growth, as well as
products, and varieties, and their interaction and all four lags of each of these as endogenous variables (total 16), and specification (6)
treats the first lag of growth and only the contemporaneous values of products, varieties and interaction as endogenous variables (total
of 4 endogenous variables). Specifications (6S), (6M), and (6L) are same as (6), but on sub-samples by initial size of business unit being
(s)mall, (m)edium and (l)arge.
††For brevity, we provide the sum of coefficients of the lagged variables. Individual coefficients for each of the lags is given in the appendix.
The standard error on the sum of lagged coefficients is computed using the ‘delta’ method and accounts for clustering.
‡‡ Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean. The account for the interaction terms, the lagged values of the variable as well as
the lagged values of growth. Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
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Table A-1. FD Growth Models†
OLS IV (6) By business unit size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6S) (6M) (6L)
τ7t: Yr 2010 -0.015 -0.026
c -0.011 -0.0040 -0.049b -0.049b -0.011 -0.084b -0.034
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.086) (0.040) (0.025)
τ8t: Yr 2011 -0.033
c -0.042a -0.023 -0.016 -0.051b -0.051b -0.0034 -0.064c -0.058b
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.088) (0.037) (0.025)
τ9t: Yr 2012 -0.014 -0.021 -0.0085 0.0012 -0.040
c -0.039c 0.023 -0.083b -0.031
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.087) (0.039) (0.030)
τ10t: Yr 2013 -0.023 -0.024 -0.0084 0.0088
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.10)
τ11t: Qtr 2 0.068
a 0.081a 0.072a 0.071a 0.083a 0.082a 0.032 0.10a 0.092a
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.0090) (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.022) (0.015)
τ12t: Qtr 3 0.062
a 0.055a 0.041a 0.042a 0.043a 0.043a 0.044c 0.032 0.037a
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.015) (0.011) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.026) (0.012)
τ13t: Qtr 4 0.058
a 0.056a 0.050a 0.051a 0.059a 0.058a 0.026 0.068a 0.048a
(1/0 Dummy, 1 if true) (0.012) (0.011) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.025) (0.012)
x0t: Constant -0.069
a -0.065a -0.077a -0.082a -0.042b -0.042b -0.064 -0.027 -0.030
(0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.086) (0.029) (0.024)
Observations 50,942 44,893 42,994 42,994 23,054 23,054 5,581 8,334 9,139
R-squared 0.535 0.514 0.513 0.507 0.521 0.521 0.624 0.462 0.395
†Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered by business unit (firm-atc4 combination). Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All regressions include additional controls at the class- and firm-level, as well as indicator variables for year
and quarter. Specification (1) does not include any lag, (2) is a distributed lag model and includes up to four lags of products, varieties
and interactions. Specification (3) is an augmented distributed lag model, and additionally includes up to four lags of the dependent
variable (i.e., growth). Specification (4) treats only the first lag of growth as endogenous, (5) treats the first lag of growth, as well as
products, and varieties, and their interaction and all four lags of each of these as endogenous variables (total 16), and specification (6)
treats the first lag of growth and only the contemporaneous values of products, varieties and interaction as endogenous variables (total
of 4 endogenous variables). Specifications (6S), (6M), and (6L) are same as (6), but on sub-samples by initial size of business unit being
(s)mall, (m)edium and (l)arge.
††For brevity, we provide the sum of coefficients of the lagged variables. Individual coefficients for each of the lags is given in the appendix.
The standard error on the sum of lagged coefficients is computed using the ‘delta’ method and accounts for clustering.
‡‡ Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean. The account for the interaction terms, the lagged values of the variable as well as
the lagged values of growth. Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
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Table A-2. First stage and other tests for instruments
(4) (5) (6) (6a) (6b) (6c)
Weak instruments tests
Endogenous Variable(s) First-stage F-statistics
gb,t−1: Growth (Lag 1) 58.6 17.58 38.27 20.39 15.92 22.6
pb,t: Products 45.85 90.34 17.21 68.41 168.35
vb,t: Variety 63.6 202.76 57.75 109.1 121.82
pbt ∗ vbt: Interaction 25.31 79.11 10.57 17.03 76.07
pb,t−1: Products (Lag 1) 80.16
pb,t−2: Products (Lag 2) 82.19
pb,t−3: Products (Lag 3) 88.94
pb,t−4: Products (Lag 4) 83.69
vb,t−1:Variety (Lag1) 62.93
vb,t−2:Variety (Lag2) 63.91
vb,t−3:Variety (Lag3) 67.02
vb,t−4:Variety (Lag4) 75.07
pb,t−1 ∗ vb,t−1: Interaction (Lag 1) 43.72
pb,t−2 ∗ vb,t−2: Interaction (Lag 2) 36.33
pb,t−3 ∗ vb,t−3: Interaction (Lag 3) 32.5
pb,t−4 ∗ vb,t−4: Interaction (Lag 4) 35.74
Under Identification Test (Ho: Model is under-identified)
Chi-Square Value 167.54 140.06 135.931 10.891 12.143 32.434
DF 1 6 2 2 2 2
P-value 0 0 0 0.0043 0.0023 0
Over Identification Test (Ho: Model is over identified)
Chi-Square Value . 4.791 0.569 0.05 0.061 2.438
DF . 5 1 1 1 1
P-value . 0.4419 0.4507 0.823 0.8056 0.1184
